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THE SOVIET  ECONOMY  iS collapsing.  In  1990, official  gross  national 
product  had  fallen  2 percent  relative  to 1989.  By the first  quarter  of 1991, 
GNP had  fallen 8 percent  relative  to a year earlier.  Moreover,  as table 1 
illustrates,  the decline has spread  to just about every sector, from  pro- 
cessed food, to consumer  durables,  to energy  and  agriculture.  Many  ob- 
servers expect this decline to continue through  1991-even  to acceler- 
ate.  ' Such a sharp  contraction  is unprecedented  in the postwar Soviet 
economy, which historically  has grown moderately  and without sharp 
interruptions. 
In August 1991,  the Soviet Union collapsed politically  as well, split- 
ting into a number  of sovereign  states with highly  uncertain  future  eco- 
nomic ties. In the face of this uncertainty,  the central  government  and 
the republics  are contemplating  reform  policies designed  to reverse the 
economic collapse. In this paper, we analyze the causes of the decline 
and  discuss what  reforms  are appropriate  and how to achieve them. 
The decline of the Soviet economy is sometimes  explained  by exoge- 
nous shocks, like the troubles  in the oil industry,  the coal strike  in the 
first  quarter  of 1990,  the collapse  of trade  with Eastern  Europe  following 
its liberation,  the plant shutdowns  for environmental  reasons, and the 
regional  frictions  in the USSR. All of these factors  doubtless  play a role, 
[Much of the data presented  in this paper were assembled by the authors  from a 
variety of Soviet sources. Care has been taken to verify their consistency with the 
original  sources. They should  nonetheless  be used with caution.-Eds.] 
1. PlanEcon Report (1991, nos.  11-12). 
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Table 1. Changes  in Output,  1989-91 
Percent 
Change  from  Change  from 
Item  1989 to 1990  1990:1  to 1991:1 
Gross national  product  -2  -8 
Total industry  -  I  - 5 
Automobiles  3  - 4 
Bath soap  1  -9 
Beef and fowl  -  I  -12 
Bread  3  14 
Cement  2  - 5 
Coal  - 5  -18 
Color  televisions  13  4 
Eggs  - 4  - 8 
Electric  energy  0  1 
Farm  equipment  -7  - 25 
Farm  goods  -2  -13 
Fertilizer  -8  -8 
Gas  2  0 
Kitchen  soap  -3  -  18 
Milk  0  -  10 
New housing  - 11  - 27 
Oil  -6  -9 
Paper  3  -6 
Processed  meat  -3  -  14 
Steel  -4  -8 
Sugar  -7  -21 
Source:  Ekonomika  i zhiztn' (1991,  nos.  5 and  17). The  output of farm goods  is measured  using real prices.  The 
output of all other goods  is measured using volumes. 
but none is completely  persuasive. Oil and coal production  have indeed 
declined  (see table 1), but  many  sectors that  are not heavy users of these 
inputs  have also suffered.  Plant  shutdowns  resulting  from environmen- 
tal concerns  have accelerated  but  are  too few to materially  affect  output. 
Trade with Eastern Europe diminished  25 percent in 1990, and much 
more sharply  in 1991, yet the beginnings  of the Soviet downturn  are 
often traced  to 1988  and 1989,  when trade  with Eastern  Europe  was still 
strong.  And  frictions  in regional  trade  in the former  Soviet Union  are  not 
an exogenous shock. Rather, they reflect the widespread refusal of 
many  firms  to produce  and  trade  at state  prices. Lithuanians  are  refusing 
to sell meat  to the Russians  at state prices not  just because they hate the 
Russians  but also because state prices are too low. Russian  farmers  as Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny  343 
well are refusing  to sell meat at state prices. In short,  exogenous shocks 
alone do not adequately  explain  Soviet problems. 
We believe that the decline in Soviet output  can be better explained 
by the combination  of severe repressed  inflation  and substantial  liberal- 
ization of plan enforcement  since 1988.  This combination  of repressed 
inflation,  which greatly  distorted  incentives, with partial  liberalization, 
which completely  undermined  plan  enforcement,  led to a breakdown  of 
traditional  economic ties and coordination  mechanisms  in the Soviet 
economy. In particular,  we focus on three channels  of the breakdown. 
First, repressed  inflation  diverted  labor  away from  productive  activities 
and into search  for goods, thus reducing  effective labor  input. Second, 
repressed  inflation  combined  with  productive  freedom  made  it attractive 
for enterprises  to hoard  intermediate  inputs, leading  to declines in out- 
put and breakdowns  in downstream  production.  Third,  repressed  infla- 
tion combined  with the freedom  to choose trading  partners  led firms  to 
resell or barter  their output to higher-paying  customers, leaving their 
traditional customers without supplies and so  reducing production 
downstream.  For all three channels  of the breakdown,  we present  evi- 
dence of the magnitude  of the problem. 
We then  discuss what  our  diagnosis  of Soviet problems  may  mean  for 
economic reform and Western aid. Like many others, we argue that 
rapid  price liberalization  is the only alternative  to rigid  planning  if nor- 
mal economic coordination  is to be restored in the Soviet economy. 
Such price  liberalization  is particularly  important  in intermediate-goods 
markets,  in which price distortions  are largely  responsible  for the eco- 
nomic collapse. We also argue  that aid from  the West should  be tightly 
conditioned  on price liberalization  and other policies that foster trade, 
with heavy penalties for policies that preclude the movement of re- 
sources. In fact, Western  donors should  encourage  competition  for aid 
between  the republics  by awarding  funds  to those that  liberalize  and  de- 
nying  them  to those that  do not. 
Repressed Inflation and Shortages 
Several studies have documented  the recent Soviet inflation  and the 
extensive shortages.2  This brief section reviews and  updates  that  work. 
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Table 2.  Inflation in the USSR, 1980-91 
Percent 
Money  Farmers' 
Official  Income  Expenditure  supply  market 
Year  inflation  growth  growth  growth  inflation 
1980  1.0  5.2  4.6  ...  14.1 
1981  1.0  4.3  5.0  ...  9.1 
1982  4.0  4.2  3.4  ...  -  1.1 
1983  0.0  4.8  4.7  ...  -  3.9 
1984  -  1.0  3.8  3.9  ...  2.8 
1985  1.0  3.7  3.7  ...  3.5 
1986  2.0  3.6  3.7  6.1  - 3.6 
1987  1.3  3.9  3.5  7.8  2.6 
1988  0.6  9.2  8.5  13.6  2.6 
1989  2.0  12.9  11.6  19.5  9.5 
1990  5.3  16.9  15.2  21.5  29.0 
1991:1 (relative to  1990:1)  ...  24.0  24.0  ...  71.0 
Sources:  Official inflation figures are from PlanEcon  Report (1991).  Income growth for 1980-89 was provided  by 
the IMF. Income figures for 1990 and 1991 come from Gaidar (1991) and Ekonomika i zhizn' (1991, no. 17), respectively. 
Expenditure  growth for  1980-89 comes  from IMF and others  (1991) and Ekonomika i zhizn' (1991, no.  17). Money 
supply growth comes  from IMF and others  (1991) and Gaidar (1991); cumulative  money  supply growth for  1980-85 
was  6 percent.  Farmers' market prices  are from Narodnoye  Khoziaistvo  SSSR,  Torgovlia SSSR,  and Ekonomika i 
zhizn' (1991, no. 6). 
The image that emerges is one of a severe repressed  inflation,  a condi- 
tion that worsened  in 1990  and the first  quarter  of 1991.  We have much 
less information  about  the period  after  the April 1 price reform,  but the 
available  data suggest  that  shortages  have not been cured. 
The first  column  of table  2 presents  changes  in the official  Soviet price 
index, which is also used in the International  Monetary  Fund-World 
Bank study. The index shows no substantial  price increases during  the 
1980s  and inflation  of only 5.3 percent in 1990.  The 1991  index has not 
yet been made available,  but official  prices had not risen substantially 
until  the April 1  retail  price  reform.  By contrast,  the next three  columns 
show the growth  of income, expenditure,  and  the money supply.  The se- 
ries reveal a sharp increase in the growth rates of all these variables 
starting  in 1988.  The preliminary  data on the first  quarter  of 1991  show 
accelerating  growth,  with  both  income  and  expenditure  about  24  percent 
higher than the first quarter  of 1990. The central government  budget 
deficit  in the first quarter  of 1991  was the largest  ever and, if anything, 
the growth  of the money supply  has probably  accelerated.3 
3.  PlanEcon Report (1991, nos.  11-12). Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny  345 
Table  3. Commersant  Monthly  Inflation,  1990  and 1991 
Percent 
Month  Inf ation 
1990 
July  1.2 
August  0.8 
September  2.8 
October  ... 
November  3.1 
December  4.5 
1991 
January  4.5 
February  5.1 
March  52.0 
April  170.0 
Source: Commersant,  various  issues. The table shows the increase  in average  living  costs from  Commersant's 
monthly  survey  of prices  in major  cities. 
Given the growth of money and income, and the rigidity  of official 
prices, it is not surprising  that a severe repressed inflation  has devel- 
oped. One way to observe it is by comparing  free market  prices with 
state prices. The last column of table 2 shows inflation  in the farmers' 
market,  which rose from a sharp  9.5 percent in 1989  to 29.0 percent in 
1990  and  71.0 percent  over the 1990:1-1991:  1 period. Since official  food 
prices did not change at all during  this period, inflation  of the farmers' 
market  prices also reflects the relative change in market and official 
prices and thus the magnitude  of repressed  inflation.  These series show 
clearly that repressed inflation  worsened in 1990  and was particularly 
bad in the beginning  of 1991. 
Table 3 shows the month-to-month increases  in the Commersant ag- 
gregate  cost-of-living  index, which reflects both state and free market 
prices. This index has the advantage  of providing  very recent informa- 
tion. It shows prices rising  by about  5 percent  a month  around  the turn 
of the year, 52 percent  in March,  in anticipation  of the price  reform,  and 
170  percent  in April  when official  prices were raised. 
Another  way to measure repressed inflation  uses market  exchange 
rates  taken  from  the black  market  and  from  state  currency  auctions  open 
to enterprises.  Table 4 presents the two series, which show surprising 
conformity.  Since the beginning  of 1990,  the ruble  has depreciated  by a 
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Table 4.  Ruble-to-Dollar Exchange Rate,  1989-91 
Black market  Black market 
Month  (buy)  (sell)  State auction 
1989 
November  ...  ...  10.0 
1990 
January  ...  ...  10.6 
February  10.0  18.0  12.6 
March  10.5  18.0  ... 
April  12.0  18.5  13.8 
May  12.0  19.0  15.0 
June  12.0  19.0  17.5 
July  15.0  21.5  20.6 
August  17.0  21.0  23.2 
September  16.0  20.5  ... 
October  16.0  19.5  20.9 
November  15.5  19.5  20.9 
December  19.5  24.0  21.6 
1991 
January  28.0  35.0  25.0 
February  25.5  29.5  35.1 
March  24.5  27.5  35.0 
April  28.5  31  31.7 
May  29  31  ... 
June  29  30  ... 
Source:  Black market rates are from Cornmersant, various issues.  The state auction prices are from Ekonornika i 
zhizn',  various issues. 
cally, the ruble  depreciated  steadily  through  1990  and then sharply  lost 
value in March 1991, around  the time that banknotes  with a high face 
value  were withdrawn  from  circulation,  which  probably  reduced  the de- 
mand  for rubles  and  created  fear  of further  reforms.  Since then, the cur- 
rency has temporarily  stabilized,  although  the depreciation  resumed  in 
the fall of 1991. 
Table 5 presents  the ratio  of state store prices to black market  prices 
for selected commodities  in Moscow in December 1990. Black market 
prices  tend  to be three  to four  times  higher,  although  for some commodi- 
ties the ratio is greater,  reaching  19  for medical  drugs. One might  infer 
from these figures  that a 200 percent  price increase would have largely 
solved  the problem of repressed  inflation. Commersant  reported that 
some black market  prices did indeed fall after the April price reform. 
Nonetheless, the problem  of shortages  has not been solved and black Andrei  Shleifer  and  Robert  W. Vishny  347 
Table 5.  Ratio of Market to State Prices, December 1990, Moscow 
Commodity  Ratio  Commodity  Ratio 
Drugs  19.0  Linoleum  2.9 
Covering wood  8.9  Sewing machine  2.8 
Iron  5.6  Refrigerator  2.6 
Beef  4.8  Rug  2.6 
Men's winter shoes  4.8  Color television  2.5 
Women's winter shoes  4.5  Children's sweater  2.4 
Automobile  4.4  Vodka  2.4 
Women's jacket  3.7  Cement  2.3 
Men's sweater  3.3  Brick  2.1 
Coffee  3.0  Bookcase  2.0 
Tea  3.0  Office desk  1.9 
Source: Ekonomika  i zhizn' (1991, no.  10). 
market  prices remain  significantly  higher  than state prices. Moreover, 
the printing  of money has continued  in 1991,  though  prices were fixed 
after  April. 
Table 6 reports  some indicators  of the shortages  in the Soviet econ- 
omy. The table shows the extraordinary  reduction  of retail  inventories 
of textiles, pointing  to how much  the "empty  shelves"  phenomenon  has 
worsened. Unfortunately,  we do not have recent data  for all goods. Ta- 
ble 7 presents  a longer  time series on retail  inventories  for all commodi- 
ties and reveals a significant  drop  in retail  stocks even before 1990.  We 
do not have a comparable  number  for 1990,  although  Ekonomika  i zhizn' 
indicates  that  inventories  fell 14  percent  that year.4  The numbers  on re- 
tail inventories,  like all the other  numbers,  point to a severe shortage  of 
goods. 
Less  Time Spent in the Workplace 
In a planned  economy where prices of goods are far below market- 
clearing  levels, goods are allocated through  search and queues rather 
than  through  markets.5  An unofficial  Soviet source  estimates  that  30 mil- 
lion man-years  are spent in queues annually-about 25 percent of the 
waking  time of every adult.6  This allocation  system has been having  a 
4. Ekonomika  i zhizn'  (1991,  no. 17,  p. 16). 
5. This section on labor  supply  effects draws  on Boycko (1991),  Roberts  (1991),  and 
Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1991). 
6. This  information  comes from  Yuri  Dikhanov  at Harvard  University. 348  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 





Commodity  level 
Socks  89.6 
Leather  shoes  63.0 
General  clothing  59.7 
Knitwear  56.2 
Silk cloth  39.1 
Wool cloth  31.5 
Cotton cloth  25.0 
Source:  Ekonomika i zhizn' (1991, no.  17). 
perverse  effect on labor  supply  as repressed  inflation  and  the underpric- 
ing of goods relative  to time have become more extreme. Suppose that 
nominal  wages rise sharply,  as happened  in the USSR in the late 1980s, 
but that nominal  prices stay fixed. Then, on the margin,  a worker  has 
more incentive to look for goods and less incentive to work for rubles, 
since increasingly  time rather  than money is needed to procure  goods. 
As a result, workers will work less and search more. From the social 
viewpoint, most time spent looking for goods is pure rent seeking and 
not productive  time. Then, as productive  labor falls, output falls, and 
workers are strictly worse off because they get fewer goods with the 
same total effort  spent on working  and searching. 
What  form  does the reduction  in the labor  effort  take?  One  possibility 
is reduced  overtime  or greater  reliance  on part-time  jobs, but there are 
no data  to confirm  this. More  likely, work  time is lost through  absentee- 
ism and other unofficial  forms of taking  time off work. In 1990  official 
measures  of "losses of time"  in industry  and  construction  were about  50 
million  man-days,  or roughly  one day a year per employee in these sec- 
tors. Of these, about 10  million  man-days  were lost to strikes,  almost  all 
of which  were coal-miners'  strikes,7  and  the rest largely  to absenteeism. 
Ekonomika  i zhizn'  (EZ)  reports  that  the 50 million  man-days  is 1.7  times 
more  than  the annual  average  for the 1986-88  period.  However, the mag- 
nitude  of the time loss is still small  and has declined since 1990.  For the 
7. Gaidar  (1991). Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny  349 
Table 7.  Stock of Consumer Goods Measured in Days of Average Retail Sales, 1980-89 
Year  Days 
1980  96 
1981  101 
1982  114 
1983  116 
1984  117 
1985  118 
1986  108 
1987  97 
1988  88 
1989  80 
Source: Aslund  (1991,  table 1, p. 19). 
first quarter  of 1991,  EZ shows that 1.2 million  man-days  were lost on 
strikes,  though  other  losses of time are not reported.  Thus, if the official 
numbers  are correct, time loss could have significantly  reduced  output 
only through  its effect on the coal industry.  More  likely, most absentee- 
ism is not counted  in the government's  statistics. 
Input  Hoarding 
In every open inflation,  money loses its function as a store of value 
and consumers hoard durables  (and dollars) as an alternative.  Firms, 
too, switch out of the national  currency  and hoard inputs to preserve 
wealth.  The  preference  for real  goods over currency  becomes even more 
extreme  when people expect an eventual  monetary  reform.  Dollars  and 
durables  in such an economy are the only ways to save. 
Soviet people probably  expect inflation  to continue  for a while. Cash 
and saving accounts are no longer an adequate  store of value. Holding 
dollars is illegal, although  some underground  entrepreneurs  undoubt- 
edly save in this way. The most attractive  store of value in the USSR is 
durables-cars,  gold, housing for individuals, and inputs for firms. 
Hoarding  is particularly  important  for firms,  which have in recent  years 
found  themselves  with more  cash than  they can distribute  to workers  or 
invest. Firms hoard  their durable  inputs, which they can either use or 
resell later. Over time, durables  have become not  just a store of value 
but also a medium  of exchange, used by firms  to procure  both desirable 
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Why would firms  hoard  durable  inputs  rather  than  their  own output? 
First, widely used inputs  tend  to be more  generic  and  hence more  liquid. 
Second, it might  be easier to keep the KGB (and the angry  public) at 
arm's length if a firm  holds a large input  inventory, since it can always 
argue  that  this inventory  is unusable  because complementary  inputs  are 
not easily available.  Holding  a large  output  inventory, by contrast,  ex- 
poses a firm to potential penalties from the government  as well as to 
blackmail  by those aware  of the inventory. 
Table  8 presents  two sets of estimates  of the ratio  of input  inventories 
to output  inventories  over time. The  first  series is the average  of the ratio 
of firms'  input  to output  inventories.  It covers firms  producing  interme- 
diate as well as final  goods. The second series is the ratio  of total inter- 
mediate-goods  inventories  to total final-goods  inventories. Both series 
show a substantial  increase  in the ratio  of input  to output  inventories  in 
the late 1980s.  However, the second series rises more  sharply,  reflecting 
the particularly  short supply  of final  goods. The Soviet Union seems to 
be experiencing  a sharp  decline  in the inventories  of finished  goods, par- 
ticularly  of final  goods, and an increased  accumulation  of intermediate- 
goods inventories,  mostly by users rather  than by producers.  This evi- 
dence is consistent  with  input  hoarding.  It is also consistent  with  precau- 
tionary  hoarding  as a way to counter  possible future  shortages  of inputs. 
Finally, the result is consistent with involuntary  hoarding, whereby 
firms  can procure  some inputs  but not others, which  results  in large  bot- 
tlenecks. All these types of hoarding  point  to coordination  failures  in the 
Soviet economy. 
The hoarding  of durable  goods by consumers  reduces retail  invento- 
ries and so raises the cost of the search  for goods.8  But the hoarding  of 
inputs by firms can do much more damage. When firms hoard inputs 
rather  than  produce,  output  falls. But  this  problem  becomes much  worse 
in the Soviet economy, where  a decline  in the output  of an upstream  pro- 
ducer disrupts production downstream. The downstream producers 
typically have no alternative supply sources, since they are usually 
closely tied to one producer  and there are no organized  intermediate- 
goods markets  where they can find  the inputs  they need. Nor can they 
import  the inputs  since foreign  exchange  is also tightly  controlled.  As a 
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Table  8. Measures  of Hoarding,  1980-89 
Average ratio  Ratio of total 
of firm input  intermediate- 
inventories  to  goods inventories 
output  to total  final- 
Year  inventories  goods inventories 
1980  4.485  4.8 
1981  4.444  4.9 
1982  4.104  4.6 
1983  3.993  4.6 
1984  3.837  4.7 
1985  4.140  4.7 
1986  4.113  5.2 
1987  4.151  5.6 
1988  4.336  5.8 
1989  4.336  6.2 
Sources: The  first  column  is from  Freinkman  (1991).  The second  column  comes from  Aslund  (1991,  table  1, p. 19). 
result,  producers  often  have to stop production  when one of their  suppli- 
ers is hoarding  its inputs. 
Such a stoppage  is especially costly when the downstream  producer 
has obtained  other, less durable  inputs  that it cannot resell. In the con- 
struction industry, whole projects are delayed because some inputs 
have been sold or stolen while the rest rust or rot on the construction 
site. Bribes and renegotiation  at higher  prices can sometimes solve the 
problem,  but such practices are by no means universal.  Bribes are ille- 
gal, and, in the current  environment,  it is often unclear  whom  to bribe  or 
renegotiate  with. 
Supply  Diversion9 
Repressed  inflation  in the Soviet Union created  prices that are both 
highly distorted  and extremely low for some goods. Some prices have 
been gradually  liberalized.  On January  1, 1991,  many wholesale prices 
were raised and even freed, although producer prices of most "im- 
portant"  commodities  are still fixed and even the allegedly free "con- 
tract"  prices between firms  are heavily regulated  and  linked  to state or- 
der prices. For many  producer  goods, free market  prices remain  much 
higher  than  the prices that  state enterprises  are permitted  to pay. 
9. The argument  in this section  is based  on Murphy,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1991). 352  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
These price distortions  give firms a tremendous  incentive to fail to 
honor plans and contracts  and to sell output  to buyers who pay more. 
The potential  buyers  to whom  inputs  are diverted  include  cooperatives, 
illegal  enterprises,  or even state enterprises  that are willing  and able to 
circumvent  the rules  governing  them. Suppliers  then simply  break  their 
contracts  at official  prices and divert  output  to these higher-paying  cus- 
tomers. To be sure, many failures to deliver are themselves a conse- 
quence of failure  to get inputs, but many also result from the ability  to 
sell to competing  bidders  at higher  prices. Unless the buyers can pay 
higher  prices, which they often lack the resources  or the legal authority 
to do, the traditional  buyers of the goods simply do not get them. And 
because Soviet firms  typically have no alternative  supply sources, the 
buyers who do not get the inputs must reduce output  as well as watch 
their  complementary  inputs  deteriorate.  In these ways, supply  diversion 
has the same adverse  consequences as input  hoarding. 
Supply diversion takes several forms. One common form is selling 
goods to parties that pay more rather  than delivering  them to the con- 
tracted  buyers. The head of a large  oil distribution  concern  has recently 
complained  that refineries  are selling their  oil to cooperatives  that then 
resell it to consumers  at three times the state price, with the result  that 
official users are experiencing acute shortages.10  Another important 
form  of diversion  is barter.  Instead  of delivering  their  products  for cash 
or enterprise  funds to the planned  or contracted  recipient,  firms  some- 
times barter  the output for commodities that their workers want, in- 
cluding  food and consumer  durables.  The fantastic  growth  of commod- 
ity exchanges  in the USSR, in which  most trades  take  the form  of barter, 
testifies to the importance  of this form  of transaction.  Barter,  however, 
is severely limited because the rate of exchange in barter  is also sup- 
posed to be governed by official relative prices, which makes it ex- 
tremely  hard  to find  a trading  partner.  Even when mutual  coincidence  of 
wants at official  prices does exist, firms  often cannot  complete  the trade 
because they cannot  access the state transportation  network.  One  other 
important  form  of diversion  is theft. EZ reports  that theft of state prop- 
erty rose by almost  one-third  from 1989  to 1990  and  then rose 39 percent 
between  the first  quarters  of 1990  and 1991.  11  The increased  theft  of state 
10. Sovetskaia  Rossiya, May 15, 1991,  p. 2. 
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Table  9. Indicators  of Supply  Diversion,  1987-91 
Volume  of unfilled  Percent of 
deliveries  in  enterprises  failing 
billions  of rubles  to meet con- 
Period  (state prices)  tractual  obligations 
1987  3.1  23 
1988  2.2  17 
1989 
First quarter  1.1  9 
Second quarter  2.8  14 
Third  quarter  3.3  21 
Fourth  quarter  3.4  19 
1990 
First quarter  2.5  13 
Second quarter  2.8  18 
Third  quarter  5.8  25 
Fourth  quarter  6.6  25 
1991 
First quarter  10  24 
Source:  Izvestiia,  various issues,  and Narodnoye  Khozaistvo  SSSR,  various issues. 
property  might  simply  reflect shortages,  but it also may indicate  better 
opportunities  for market  resale. 
Table 9 presents two measures  of supply diversion. The first series 
shows the volume of unmet deliveries, measured  as the ruble value of 
deliveries  that  were contracted  for but not made. The value rises from  2 
billion  rubles  in 1988,  to 17.7  billion  rubles  in 1990,  and 10  billion  rubles 
in the first  quarter  of 1991.  Although  the nominal  value  of the 1991  figure 
might,  in part,  reflect  the higher  wholesale  prices  used in the calculation, 
the growth  is impressive  nonetheless. The second series is the fraction 
of enterprises  failing  to meet their  contract  commitments.  Its value  rises 
from 17 percent in 1988  to 25 percent in the last two quarters  of 1990. 
For the first  quarter  of 1991,  according  to the paper  Izvestiia, the largest 
number  of enterprises  failing  to meet their contract  commitments  were 
in the chemical  and timber  complex, with slightly  fewer in the metallur- 
gical complex; the fuel and energy complex and the machinebuilding 
complex also had substantial  numbers  of firms  not meeting  their com- 
mitments.  12 The paper  concludes  that  the breakdown  of economic ties is 
having  "the  most pernicious  effect"  on contract  discipline. 
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In the distorted  Soviet economy, people who can  pay the most  for the 
inputs, and thus get them, are not necessarily  the ones who value these 
inputs most. When consumer  goods are diverted  from the retail sector 
and  resold  privately,  one usually  thinks  that  consumers  who value  these 
goods most highly  are the ones who buy them. But with inputs  the story 
is more complicated.  Producers  who most value some inputs may not 
have the cash to purchase  them, or may not have the sought-after  items 
to barter  for these inputs,  or may  be prevented  from  legally  participating 
in the market  competition  for inputs. Absent equal access of all buyers 
to the market  for goods, there is no reason to believe that output  diver- 
sion to those who pay more raises efficiency and output. Having some 
market  transactions  when most activities are coordinated  through  plan 
can actually  reduce  output. 
Evidence  from  the construction  industry  suggests  that  disruptions  as- 
sociated  with the diversion  of inputs  are  large.  Table 10  reports  the ratio 
of new capacity introduced  into operation  to construction  investment 
outlays  in the Soviet Union. Construction  is a good example  of an indus- 
try that would greatly  suffer  from supply  diversion, since it is not verti- 
cally integrated,  relies on a large number  of inputs, and competes for 
many of the scarce inputs with private builders. Construction  invest- 
ment has been falling  sharply  in the USSR in the past few years, which 
suggests  that,  because  of production  lags, the ratio  of newly installed  ca- 
pacity  to investment  should  rise. In fact, the table shows that  it has been 
falling  rapidly,  from almost 100 percent in 1980  to 86 percent in 1990. 
Moreover, most of the decline has occurred since 1988, when the re- 
forms  started.  In the first  quarter  of 1991,  this ratio  was 41 percent,  down 
from  51 percent  in the first  quarter  of 1990.  These numbers  from  the con- 
struction  industry,  which are viewed with great concern by the Soviet 
government,  are  a clear  indication  of bottlenecks  and  coordination  prob- 
lems that  undoubtedly  are reducing  output. 
In sum, the collapse  of the Soviet economy  is at least in part  explained 
by the breakdown  of traditional  coordination  channels  and  the resulting 
diversion of labor and inputs. Such diversion directly reduces output, 
but also leads indirectly  to the breakdown  of downstream  production. 
These coordination  problems  make us wonder why Soviet output has 
not fallen even more;  they certainly  invite no optimism  about  a sponta- 
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Table 10.  New Capacity Installed Relative to Capital Outlay (Measured in 
State Prices), 1980-91 
Year  Ratio 
1980  0.987 
1981  0.955 
1982  0.971 
1983  0.974 
1984  0.976 
1985  0.962 
1986  0.940 
1987  0.950 
1988  0.882 
1989  0.864 
1990  0.863 
1991:1  0.411 
Source:  Freinkman (1991); Ekonomika i zhizn',  various issues. 
Implications  for Policy 
If our diagnosis of the Soviet  Union's problems is correct, the econ- 
omy is likely to decline further. The republics are likely to experience 
severe trade tensions and even trade wars, which will aggravate the co- 
ordination problems.  Some republics will introduce their own curren- 
cies,  which will put even  more pressure on the ruble. With no budget 
controls, the ruble, as well as some republican currencies, might hyper- 
inflate. Policies  to reverse the collapse  of the Soviet economy  must re- 
store economic  coordination and stop money printing. In this section, 
we first discuss  what policies  these  might be and then suggest ways  of 
implementing them. 
Price Reform 
Economic  coordination can be achieved with either a tight plan or an 
effective  market. If the central authorities could use commands to en- 
force labor "discipline," prevent input hoarding, and avert supply diver- 
sion,  they  could  reduce  the  severity  of the coordination  breakdown. 
Central command,  however,  has many disadvantages.  First, even  if it 
reverses the economic  collapse,  it is incompatible with long-run liberal- 
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state  plan  enforcement  apparatus,  notably  the Communist  party  and  the 
KGB, were weakening  even before the August coup and were largely 
dismantled  after  it failed. No one is left, then, to enforce the plans, and 
the public does not want to bring  back the enforcers. Third, and most 
important,  the control  of economic  policy has moved from  the center  to 
the republics,  and  the republics  show no interest  in giving  power  back  to 
the center. The return  to tight  central  planning  is infeasible. 
An alternative solution is to greatly expand market allocation of 
goods throughout  the economy, particularly  of intermediate  goods. 
Conversion  to markets  would  require  the complete  replacement  of state 
orders  for goods with contracts  between enterprises  at completely  free 
prices. The key feature  of this system would  be equal  access by all firms 
to the competition  for inputs. This could be accomplished  through  the 
commodity exchanges that are now prospering in many regions or 
through  longer-term  market  mechanisms  that  exist in the West. Perhaps 
most important,  this competition  should  take place between the repub- 
lics as well as within  them  because restrictions  on interrepublican  trade 
are certain  to devastate  the economy. 
To create reasonable  access by all firms to scarce inputs, all firms 
must have information  on what inputs  are available  as well as have the 
ability  to transport  them. Today, lack of access to railroads  is one of the 
main impediments  to transactions  between enterprises. Private busi- 
nesses usually use trucks, which are inefficient  and unreliable.  Access 
to transport  is critical  for the market  allocation  of inputs  and should  be 
one of the first  steps of the reform  process. 
Monetary Reform 
Price liberalization  risks a hyperinflation.  Firms  are effectively con- 
trolled by workers, who will undoubtedly  succeed in raising  wages as 
prices increase. A fairly standard  hyperinflationary  spiral  could result. 
Although  a hyperinflation  is not the worst  thing  that  could happen  to the 
Soviet economy-it  might speed up reforms and clear out the old 
money-it  has large  costs. To avoid  a hyperinflation,  price  liberalization 
must be accompanied  by monetary  and fiscal discipline, a policy that 
will prove extremely difficult  because the republics  currently  have no 
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Price liberalization  may itself be the most important  step toward  fiscal 
tightening,  since a tremendous  fraction  of the state budget  is devoted to 
price subsidies. 
Monetary  stabilization  is essential to avoid a hyperinflation.  It has 
several  other  benefits  as well, including  an increase  in the attractiveness 
of money as a store of value. But price liberalization  is a critical step 
even if monetary  restraint  proves elusive. For even if price reform  leads 
to rapid  open inflation  in the republics, many of the distortions  of the 
current repressed-inflation  regime will be  removed. For example, 
money will recover  its use as a medium  of exchange, with the result  that 
transactions  for cash will replace  inefficient  barter.  Moreover,  as argued 
earlier,  the incentive to hoard  inputs  is weaker  in an open inflation  than 
in a repressed  inflation.  Apart  from  all the other efficiency  benefits  that 
will result  from  a move to the market  pricing  and allocation  of goods, it 
pays to convert a repressed  inflation  into an open one. 
Monetary  stabilization  is virtually  certain  to take place at the republi- 
can level. Republics  will undoubtedly  introduce  their own currencies. 
One reason for this is nationalism.  More important,  once one republic 
introduces  its own currency  and removes rubles  from  circulation,  other 
republics  face an enormous  pressure  to follow suit  to prevent  rubles  that 
are no longer  legal tender  in the first republic  from being spent in their 
own territories.  The only Nash equilibrium  in currency  reforms  is for 
everyone to have them. From  the point of view of achieving  monetary 
control,  the introduction  of new currencies  by the republics  seems quite 
attractive.  First, it will get rid of the ruble, perhaps  through  a hyperin- 
flation.  Second, republican  currencies  will place responsibility  for mon- 
etary stability with republican  governments, which unlike the center 
have actually  retained  some taxing authority.  In the intermediate  run, 
then, the breakup  of the USSR might have actually encouraged  price 
stability.  The combination  of price  liberalization  and  monetary  stabiliza- 
tion will provide the economies of the successor states to the Soviet 
Union with a much more efficient allocation system than the one that 
currently  exists. When  money rather  than  time begins to buy goods and 
when lines disappear,  people will likely work more than they do now. 
Monetary  stabilization  and  elimination  of queues  are also likely to elimi- 
nate the incentives  to hoard  that now affect both consumers  and enter- 
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plague the Soviet economy today are likely to become less severe. As- 
suming  that  the market  infrastructure  is allowed  to work, the collapse  of 
output  might  be reversed. 
Getting from  Here  to There 
It is clear  that  price  liberalization  is the right  policy for the former  So- 
viet Union;  it is much  less clear  how to achieve it. Many  republics  today 
are run by populist politicians wary of reforms that bring significant 
short-run  hardships.  Recall that Premier  Prunskiene,  a reform-minded 
leader  of Lithuania,  was fired  by her own people in early 1991  when she 
advocated  price reforms.  The public  is skeptical  about  market  reforms, 
in part,  because people are poor and do not want more hardship  and, in 
part, because they are not convinced that capitalism  is the way to go. 
Finally, even after  the failure  of the August coup, the bureaucrats  who 
still  run  the economy often oppose reform  because it will take  away  their 
official  privileges. 
In practice,  this implies  that reforms  are likely to be slow and not al- 
ways strongly  market  oriented.  Conditional  Western  aid can be a potent 
force in getting  the republics  to move toward  the market.  The sharp  fall 
of the Soviet economy makes some kind  of aid virtually  inevitable.  But 
will this aid be a stopgap  measure,  which  will only delay reforms,  or will 
it actually speed up market reforms? How can aid be structured  to 
achieve the latter? 
To promote  faster  market  reforms,  the West should  aid the republics 
rather  than  the center. This  means, to start,  recognizing  the republics  as 
sovereign states, admitting  them to the World Bank and the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, and otherwise encouraging  sovereignty. This 
also means  negotiating  structural  adjustment  aid  as well as humanitarian 
aid directly  with the republics  rather  than with the central  government 
in Moscow and  dealing  with the republics  in matters  of trade  and  foreign 
direct  investment. 
For many reasons, aid to the republics will accelerate market re- 
forms. First, the elected republican  leaders, and not the central  govern- 
ment, have the power and authority  to propose and implement  changes 
in their  local economies. As the example  of Poland  illustrates,  the transi- 
tion to markets  requires  many  sacrifices  from  a country's  citizens. With- 
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ket might  not have been possible in Poland.  The Soviet Union today has 
no popular  national  leader  like Walesa. Few people would accept sacri- 
fices brought  about  by reforms  initiated  by Mikhail  Gorbachev.  In fact, 
a Moscow stamp on a reform proposal is probably  a near-fatal  blow 
against  it. To promote  reform,  the West should  direct  aid to the repub- 
lics, whose leaders  can actually  energize  their  people to change. 
Second, dealing directly with the republics  will allow aid to be tai- 
lored to each region's needs. When  a republic  is ready  to privatize,  the 
West can work  with it on a privatization  program.  When  one wants sub- 
stantial  foreign  direct  investment  and  can  promise  the security  of foreign 
property,  the West can work out with that republic  the guarantees  of 
such security. If a republic  decides that  it wants to go slowly and that it 
does not mind socialism after all, the West can refuse aid. By dealing 
directly with the republics, the lenders can design aid packages most 
conducive  to reform. 
Third, and most important,  dealing with the republics  will give the 
West a great deal more leverage in making  sure that reforms  do take 
place. If one republic  reforms  and  another  does not, the West can  tilt the 
aid toward the one that is making  changes. Fostering competition  be- 
tween republics  for aid is certain  to speed up reform.  After all, the best 
thing  the Soviet republics  have to offer the West in exchange for aid is 
rapid  reform.  If, by contrast,  aid is centrally  directed,  there  will be end- 
less negotiations  and compromises,  with the West having  few options 
but to bargain  with Moscow bureaucrats-a  sure way to slow down 
reform. 
Channeling  aid  through  Moscow also means  dealing  with  a committee 
of republican  leaders, some of whom want to reform  faster than  others 
and  all of whom  want  a slice of the same  pie and  will bargain,  rather  than 
compete, for a bigger  slice. Dealing  with such a committee  is certain  to 
delay, maybe  derail,  critical  reforms. 
Even apart  from  competition  for aid, other  strong  competitive  forces 
begin  to work  when  republics  pursue  reforms  independently.  If Ukraine 
liberalizes  its prices but Belorussia  does not, resources will flow from 
Belorussia  to Ukraine.  Belorussian  farms  and firms  will sell their  crops 
and products  in Ukraine,  where prices are free, rather  than  in Belorus- 
sia, where they are controlled. Ukrainians  then get the goods, while 
Belorussians  get the worthless  rubles.  As a result, shortages  in Belorus- 
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of goods out of Belorussia  will put tremendous  pressure  on its govern- 
ment to free up prices so that its people can consume the output  of its 
firms  and  farms. If Western  aid can get the ball rolling  in some regions, 
other  regions  will face a strong  incentive  to liberalize  too. 
Unfortunately,  another  response to competition  is to close borders, 
so that  a republic's  products  cannot  escape. The typical  Soviet republic 
believes that it is subsidizing  the others. As shortages  become more se- 
vere, trade  wars  between  republics  are  a genuine  risk,  especially  if some 
liberalize faster than others. Such trade wars will devastate the ex- 
tremely  interdependent  republican  economies. One hopes that the con- 
sequences of trade wars will themselves dissuade even nationalist  re- 
publican  leaders  from starting  them. But if that is not enough, Western 
aid might  become critical  for resolving  conflict,  through  facilitating  trad- 
ing arrangements  and  turning  against  any region  or republic  that  tries to 
interfere  with trade. Like the Marshall  Plan in Western  Europe, aid to 
the Soviet republics  should  be conditional  on liberal  trade  policies. 
There is no guarantee  that economic reform  at the republican  level 
will be strictly  better  than  reform  originating  from  the center. Many  re- 
publics  will try their  own economic experiments  guided  by nationalism 
and populism  rather  than by economic principles. As republics  intro- 
duce their  own currencies,  some will experience  rapid  inflations  or even 
hyperinflations.  As some republics  begin to free prices, trade  wars and 
perhaps even hotter conflicts with their neighbors  will flare. Despite 
these concerns, it is better  to direct  aid to republics,  where  the authority 
and the will to reform  actually  reside. 